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Within the debate on labour market activation policies and the public discussion on 
unemployment benefit sanctions and their effectiveness in raising transition rates back to 
employment, increasing attention has been paid on the role of caseworkers in employment 
offices. Caseworkers’ behavioural decisions may be influenced by a combination of factors, 
such as available resources, personal characteristics and attitudes, which may lead to 
different sanction outcomes for unemployed people. 
This working paper aims to identify whether there are consistent patterns in benefit 
sanctions rates across local employment offices (i.e. Jobcentre Plus offices) in Scotland. I 
used data from official UK government statistics covering monthly counts of unemployment 
benefit claimants and adverse sanctions for 93 Jobcentre Plus offices, for the period 
between April 2004 and September 2015. In this working paper, I provide a descriptive 
account of Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) sanction rates and contrast trends before and after 
October 2012, the month which marked the introduction of a new JSA sanctioning regime, 
characterised by more severe and lengthened sanctions. 
KEY POINTS 
• JSA adverse sanction rates increased considerably after October 2012 across most of
Jobcentre Plus offices (JPC) in Scotland.
• Across the board, sanction rates peaked in the period following October 2012 to
subsequently decrease. In a number of JCP offices in Scotland, post-2012 sanction
rate levels do not revert to pre-2012 levels.
• From a visual inspection of patterns of JSA sanction rates, it is not possible to detect
any consistent differences between JCP offices over time.
• Hence this descriptive account, which is based on aggregate data on JSA sanction
rates, does not seem to provide any evidence in support of the claim that there may
be differences in the cultural environment operating within different JCP offices.
• Individual-level data is needed to ascertain whether there are any ‘cultural’
differences towards sanctioning between JCP offices.
BACKGROUND 
Activation policies, aimed at helping unemployed people to rapidly move or return to work, 
is considered a prominent feature of the UK welfare system. Since the 1980s, eligibility 
criteria for unemployed benefits have required claimants to be both available for work and 
actively seeking work. The introduction of the Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) in October 1996 
marked a tightening of job-search requirements, through the establishment of fortnightly 
job-search monitoring meetings and participation in government programmes aimed at 
improving employability. The introduction of JSA also entailed the enforcement of sanctions 
with the reduction, suspension or withdrawal of benefits in case of claimants’ non-
compliance. Starting from the early 2000s, job-search requirements and monitoring have 
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been progressively extended to other groups, such as lone parents, claimants of incapacity 
benefits and partners of benefit claimants. 
More recently, reforms of the JSA regime have led to a further tightening of the monitoring 
of job-search activities while concurrently extending the use of sanctions to ensure 
behavioural compliance. With the implementation of a new JSA sanctioning regime in 
October 2012, the minimum length of sanction episodes has increased from one week to 
four weeks. This applies for ‘low-level’ non-compliance, for instance, when JSA claimants fail 
to attend a job-search review meeting or to participate in a training programme. The 
maximum length of sanctions has increased from 26 weeks to three years, which applies for 
‘high-level’ non-compliance or repeated failure, such as the case when JSA claimants 
repeatedly fail to apply for or take up a suitable job, or alternatively loose a job due to 
misconduct (OECD, 2014a; Watts, Fitzpatrick, Bramley and Watkins, 2014). 
Since its institution in 2002, Jobcentre Plus (JCP) has played a key role in providing advisory 
services to enable the job matching process of unemployed people to available vacancies. 
JCP also contributes to enhancing jobseekers’ employability and their employment 
opportunities by providing guidance and support through more tailored services, such as in-
depth counselling interviews and referral to active labour market programmes and training 
programmes. 
Caseworkers (also known as ‘employment advisors’ or ‘work coaches’) play a major role in 
delivering JCP services. In particular, decisions adopted by caseworkers may affect the 
labour market outcomes of benefit claimants. One possible way in which this can occur is, 
for example, through the initial assessment conducted by caseworkers at registration of a 
benefit claim. Initial assessments are usually performed to identify different groups of 
claimants, based on their different levels of needs of support. For instance, claimants who 
are initially evaluated as at risk of long-term unemployment may be allocated to specific 
services and programmes to help them increase their employability. In conducting initial 
assessments and tailoring monitoring plans for groups of claimants with different needs and 
barriers to work, caseworkers in JCP local offices operate with a substantial degree of 
discretion as well-defined and articulated formal profiling procedures are absent (OECD, 
2014a: p. 126). Moreover, caseworkers have a dual role as they provide benefit claimants 
with support and advice in their search for work, whilst at the same time they are also 
required to monitor their clients’ job-search efforts and refer them for sanctions when 
specific behavioural requirements, such as attending review appointments, are not met. 
Hence, caseworkers may differ in their advisory and monitoring styles and this will depend 
on different factors, such as access to available resources at the level of local JCP offices and 
personal and attitudinal characteristics. The combination of these multiple factors may have 
different repercussions on the labour market outcomes of benefit claimants registered in 
JCP offices in different geographical areas. 
International evidence of the effects of caseworkers in public employment agencies on 
benefit sanctions is rather scant and displays a certain degree of ambiguity. To date, the 
only studies available tend to focus on the duration of unemployment benefits (an overview 
of studies that are discussed in the following is presented in table 1 in Appendix). For 
Switzerland, a study by Behncke, Frölich and Lechner (2010) revealed that unemployment 
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benefit recipients, who were allocated to less supportive caseworkers at registration, had a 
higher propensity to make a transition back to employment and had more stable jobs. No 
differences were observed in terms of use of longer sanctions and referrals to active labour 
market programmes. In a more recent study, Huber, Lechner and Mellace (2014) were able 
to decompose the caseworker’s effect into an indirect effect (i.e. via the assignment of 
benefit recipients to active labour market programmes) and a direct effect (e.g. via the use 
of sanctions, exertion of pressure to accept jobs and personal traits pertaining to counselling 
style). However, the authors did not find any significant effect related to the allocation of 
benefit recipients to active labour market programmes, whereas they found a positive and 
significant direct effect which levelled off over time. Drawing on Swiss unemployment 
register data linked to information on earnings from social security administrative data, 
Arni, Lalive and van Ours (2013) distinguished between ‘ex-ante effects’, which were related 
to sanction warnings, and ‘ex-post effects’, related to sanctions enforcement. The study 
revealed higher exit rates from unemployment for both recipients to whom a sanction was 
imposed and for those who were not sanctioned after receiving a warning. For both groups, 
higher transitions back to employment occurred at a cost of reduced post-unemployment 
earnings. However, only sanctioned claimants experienced higher levels of discontinuous 
employment, suggesting that the negative effects of benefit sanctions can be attenuated by 
combining a reduction in the severity of benefit sanctions (enforcement) and an increase in 
monitoring intensity (warning).  
 
In the case of Germany a study by Müller (2007), using integrated individual- and regional-
level administrative data, reported that the probability of receiving unemployment benefit 
sanctions varies significantly at a regional level. According to the author, this result seems to 
point to the existence of differences in the implementation of activation policies across local 
employment agencies. In a different study, Loopstra, Reeves, McKee and Stuckler (2015) 
utilised aggregated data at local authority level for the United Kingdom and fixed-effect 
models correcting for geospatial correlation. Despite finding a considerable variation in total 
sanction referral rates (including decisions rates for adverse, non-adverse and 
cancellation/reserved decisions) across local authorities, the authors failed to detect any 
association between sanctioning rates and overall local-authority level employment and 
unemployment rates. A more recent study for Germany by Schmieder and Trenkle (2016), 
who used a regression discontinuity design to analyse individual-level administrative data 
matched with caseworkers’ information, demonstrated that caseworkers do not act 
differently on the basis of different level of eligibility of benefit recipients. In other words, 
caseworkers do not seem to shift resources according to the different needs and eligibility 
characteristics of recipients.  
 
In this descriptive working paper, I address the following two research questions: 
 
1. Is there a variation in Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) sanction rates before and after 
the introduction of a new Sanctioning Regime which occurred in October 2012? 
2. Is there a variation in JSA sanction rates by Jobcentre Plus (JCP) offices in Scotland? 
 
The remaining part of the document is organised as follows. In the next section, I will 
describe the data and method used. Subsequently, I will present the main findings derived 
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from descriptive visualisations of trends based in adverse sanction rates by Jobcentre Plus 
from Scottish aggregate data for the period before and after October 2012. In the final 
section I will present a brief discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
I used aggregated monthly data on JSA adverse sanction and claimant count (seasonally 
adjusted) for 93 Jobcentre Plus (JCP) offices in Scotland, covering the period from April 2000 
to September 2015, the latest available data point at the time when the analyses were 
conducted. The monthly data for JSA adverse sanctions were obtained from the UK 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) database ‘JSA Sanction Decisions - all decisions 
made’ (DWP, 2016a). The monthly data on claimants count were retrieved from the Official 
Labour Market Statistics (Nomis) database, which is run by the University of Durham on 
behalf of the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2016). Monthly counts for JCP offices from 
the two data sources were harmonised. Two JCP offices (St. Andrews and Fraserburgh) were 
excluded as they constitute outliers (for details, see figure 1 in Appendix, pp.22 and 25). 
Note that during the period covered by the collected data, there have been considerable 
changes to JCP offices, with existing offices closing, or merging with other offices, and new 
offices opening. It is possible that the rapid changes in the landscape of JCP offices may have 
given rise to recording errors in both adverse sanction and claimant counts. While it was not 
possible to correct for these sources of errors, the data was harmonised to the best of my 
knowledge by taking into account overtime changes that occurred in JCP offices, with some 
of these – for instance - becoming dormient or inactive after a period or being merged into 
pre-existing offices. Details of the choices taken while harmonising the data can be seen in 
table 2 in Appendix. 
 
The UK sanctioning system is complex. A referral for a sanction is usually issued by a 
caseworker (or employment advisor) at a JCP office, or a member of staff of a Work 
Programme provider1. Generally a sanction referral occurs when a JSA claimant fails to 
comply with a mandatory requirement of benefit receipt, for instance by missing a 
mandatory appointment with a JCP caseworker or by failing to take part in a Work 
Programme. The referral is then reviewed by a specialised decision maker, who is located in 
a different office from the JCP office of the front-line caseworker. The decision maker has 
the task to decide on whether or not to impose a sanction. A JSA benefit recipient who has 
received a sanction has the option to ask for a reconsideration of the decision2 and, in the 
case the original decision is upheld, claimants are given the opportunity to appeal the 




                                                          
1 The Work Programme was introduced in June 2011 and was largely characterised by the expansion of a 
quasi-market approach in the delivery of employment services for several groups of clients, including the long-
term unemployed (OECDb, 2014). 
2 According to Webster (2016a, p. 9), following the introduction of mandatory reconsideration in October 
2013, the share of JSA sanction which were challenged declined while, at the same time, the share of 
successful challenges increased. As a result, the share of sanctions which are overturned remained unaltered. 
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A sanction referral can lead to four possible decision outcomes (DWP, 2016b): 
1. A decision to apply a sanction (adverse) constitutes an unfavourable outcome for the
JSA claimant and can be made at different stages, i.e. at original decision-making,
reconsideration or following an appeal.
2. A decision not to apply a sanction (non-adverse) constitutes a favourable outcome
for the claimant and can be made at any stage as for adverse sanction decisions (see
point 1 above).
3. A reserved decision refers to a case where a sanction cannot be imposed because
the claimant has interrupted a JSA claim.
4. A cancelled referral refers to a cancelled decision occurring in specific circumstances,
for instance when the decision-maker has failed to obtain further documentation
following a request to the original JCP office and it is not possible to obtain the
required information from another source.
The focus of this working paper is on adverse sanctions. In particular, following the 
harmonisation of adverse sanction and claimant count data3, I first constructed a sanction 
rate, computed as the ratio of total adverse sanction decisions over the total number of 
benefit claimants in each quarter (i.e. three-month period) in each JCP local office in 
Scotland. I then went on to create an indicator of change in sanction rates, calculated as the 
difference between a given sanction rate for a specific JCP office in a given quarter and the 
average sanction rate for all JCP offices in Scotland measured at October 2012, time point in 
which major reforms of the JSA sanctioning regime occurred.  
Differences in sanction rates relative to October 2012 were visualised by implementing 
‘Lowess’ command (Cleveland, 1979; Cleveland and Devlin, 1988) in Stata/MP version 12.1. 
‘Lowess’ command performs a locally weighted regression of a dependent variable (in this 
study: differences in sanction rates compared to October 2012) on an independent variable 
(yearly quarters). By using a non-parametric approach - which relaxes the linearity 
assumptions of conventional regression methods - separate regression models are fitted to 
a cluster of neighbouring observations to any given data point, provided by sanction rate 
differences for each successive quarter. The width of the cluster of neighbouring 
observations is determined by using the option bandwidth. Note that the greater the 
bandwidth, the greater the smoothing of the regression function. In this working paper, all 
the plots that are presented in the next section and appendix were obtained by using 
bandwidth (0.1). This means that 10 percent of the data were used to estimate the locally 
weighted regressions.  
MAIN FINDINGS 
Figure 1 shows the trends in differences in sanction rates compared to October 2012 
(indicated by the vertical grey dashed line) across 92 JCP offices, covering 17 geographical 
3 Note that starting from May 2013, the claimant count data published in ONS Nomis database include the 
number of people claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance plus those who claim Universal Credit and are out of work 
(ONS, 2015). 
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areas and 4 JCP Districts in Scotland4. Negative differences, illustrated by trends located 
below the grey horizontal bar, indicate that observed sanction rates were lower than the 
average computed over all JCP offices in October 2012. Positive differences for trends above 
the grey horizontal bar mean that sanction rates exceeded the average sanction rate at 
October 2012. 
Two main observations can be highlighted. First, during the period prior to October 2012, a 
consistent finding across the majority of JCP offices is that changes in sanction rates were 
negative. This means that sanction rates prior to October 2012 were below the average 
sanction rate over all JCP offices, as measured in October 2012. In most cases, changes in 
sanction rates followed a non-linear pattern although with an increasing gradient, as time 
approached October 2012. A peak in differences in sanction rates was observed around 
October 2012 and in the immediately following period, with trends either approaching the 
zero threshold (indicated by the red horizontal bar) or exceeding it, denoting that current 
sanction rates were either equal or greater than the overall average computed for October 
2012. In the most recent period, a decreasing trend was observed. However, in a number of 
cases, levels in sanction-rate differences, recorded for the latest available quarters in 2015, 
did not reach those observed at the outset of the illustrated trends. 
4 Note that while the levels of JCP offices and districts were originally present in the collected data, the 
intermediate level of geographical areas (broadly covering Local Authorities boundaries) was introduced to 
ease the comparison across numerous JCP offices belonging to different JCP districts. 
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Figure 1. Differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012;  Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
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Glasgow, Lanarkshire and East Dunbartonshire
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Second, from a visual inspection of overall changes in sanction rates before and after 
October 2012, it was not possible to detect any consistent differences or variation across 
JCP offices within different JCP areas and districts. Hence, the descriptive account of 
patterns of quarterly changes in sanction rates, based on the aggregated data illustrate in 
figure 1, does not seem to provide any evidence in support of the claim, emerged from the 
literature, of an existence of differences in the cultural environment at local JCP offices. 
Plausibly, the information channelled by aggregated data may not be sufficient to detect 
persistent differences across JCP offices. Individual longitudinal data, including information 
on the sanction histories of JSA benefit claimants and their contacts with allocated 
caseworkers or employment advisors at the JCP office, may offer an important opportunity 
to disentangle the role played by individual characteristics and resources from the role 
played by the cultural context at the level of local JCP offices. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The descriptive account of changes in JSA adverse sanction rates across JCP offices in 
Scotland, which this working paper covers, is part of an exercise that was conducted to 
ascertain the existence of different patterns across different JCP offices, areas and JCP 
districts.  
 
The aim of the descriptive exercise was to address two distinct research questions. First, on 
the basis of available aggregate quarterly data for Scotland, is it possible to identify a 
variation in JSA sanction rates before and after October 2012? This date marks the 
introduction of a new sanction regime in UK, which was characterised by a further 
tightening of behavioural requirements for JSA claimants and an expanded use of punitive 
sanctions to enforce behavioural compliance. Second, is it possible to identify a variation in 
JSA sanction rates across different JCP offices, located in different areas and JCP districts? 
The idea here is that differences in sanction rates across JCP offices may reflect contextual 
differences in terms of style and approach to sanctioning prevailing between JCP offices. 
Findings show that JSA adverse sanction rates increased substantially after October 2012 
across most JCP offices in Scotland. Across the board, sanction rates peaked in the period 
following October 2012 to subsequently decrease. This result is consistent with other 
reports based on aggregated UK data (Loopstra et al., 2015; Webster, 2016b). However, no 
consistent differences in benefit sanction rates emerged across JCP offices located in 
different areas or JCP districts. Hence, no evidence was found in support of the claim that 
there may be differences in the cultural environment operating within different JCP offices. 
This is in contrast to other studies, for the UK and Germany, which found considerable 
geographical variation in sanction rates which may be linked to differences in sanction 
implementation across local employment offices (Loopstra et al. 2015; Müller, 2007). An 
emerging body of studies, based on individual administrative data, report contrasting 
evidence. On the one hand, a significant and positive effect in the allocation of benefit 
claimants was found for Switzerland at the level of the caseworker or employment advisor 
in terms of adopted monitoring style, use of sanctions and exertion of pressure to accept 
jobs (Huber et al., 2014). On the other hand, no differences were detected between 
caseworkers or employment advisors in terms of use of sanctions or in allocating different 
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benefit claimants according to their different needs or characteristics (see Behncke et al. 
(2010) for Switzerland, and Schmieder and Trenkle (2016) for Germany). 
 
Further research, using individual-level data and adopting a quasi-experimental design, is 
needed in order to ascertain the existence of a caseworker or employment advisor’s effect 
and disentangle the different mechanisms leading to the adoption of different sanctioning 
implementation styles and approaches within local employment offices. There is also a need 
to investigate the wider and long-term consequences of benefit sanctions for claimants and 
their families in terms of employment outcomes, education, poverty and social exclusion, 





Arni, P., Lalive, R., & Ours, J. C. V. (2013). How effective are unemployment benefit 
sanctions? Looking beyond unemployment exit. Journal of applied econometrics, 28(7), 
1153-1178. 
 
Behncke, S., Frölich, M., & Lechner, M. (2010). Unemployed and their caseworkers: Should 
they be friends or foes? Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 
173(1), 67-92.  
 
Cleveland, W. S. (1979). Robust locally weighted regression and smoothing scatterplots. 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74(368), 829-836. 
 
Cleveland, W. S. & Devlin, S. J. (1988). Locally weighted regression: An approach to 
regression analysis by local fitting. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 83(403), 
596-610. 
 
DWP (2016a). Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) Sanction Decisions – all decisions made (Stat-
Xplore database). Available from: https://stat-xplore.dwp.gov.uk/. 
 
DWP (2016b). Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) Sanction Decisions (Metadata for Stat-Xplore 
database). Available from: https://stat-xplore.dwp.gov.uk/. 
 
Huber, M., Lechner, M., & Mellace, G. (2014). Why do tougher caseworkers increase 
employment? The role of programme assignment as a causal mechanism. St. Gallen: 
Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. 
 
Lalive, R., Ours, J. C. v., & Zweimüller, J. (2005). The effect of benefit sanctions on the 
duration of unemployment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(6), 1386-1417.  
 
Loopstra, R., Reeves, A., McKee, M., & Stuckler, D (2015). Do punitive approaches to 
unemployment benefit recipients increase welfare exit and employment? A cross-area 
analysis of UK sanctioning reforms. Sociology Working Papers 2015-01. Oxford: Department 
of Sociology, University of Oxford. 
11 
 
Müller, K.-U. (2007). Individual and regional determinants of receiving unemployment 
benefit sanctions in Germany. AStA Wirtschafts-und Sozialstatistisches Archiv, 1(3), 275-286.  
 
OECD (2014a). Connecting people with Jobs. Activation policies in the United Kingdom. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Publishing. 
 
OECD (2014b). Quasi –market arrangements in the UK Work Programme. In OECD (ed.) 
Connecting people with Jobs. Activation policies in the United Kingdom (pp. 181-244).  
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Publishing. 
ONS (2015). Claimant count overview (Metadata for Nomis – Official Labour Market 
Statistics -database). Available from: https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/articles/922.aspx 
 
ONS (2016). Claimant count –seasonally adjusted (Nomis – Official Labour Market Statistics -
database). Available from: https://nomisweb.co.uk 
 
Watts, B., Fitzpatrick, S., Bramley, G., & Watkins, D. (2014). Welfare sanctions and 
conditionality in the UK. Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
 
Webster, D. (2016a). Briefing: The DWP’s JSA/ESA sanctions statistics release, 18 May 2016. 
Available from: http://www.cpag.org.uk. 
 
Webster, D. (2016b). Sanctions: The missing evidence. Paper presented at the seminar 
‘Sanctions and inequalities: What do we know and need to know about the impact of 
benefit sanctions in particular?’ London: Centre for Analysis and Social Exclusion (CASE), 
London School of Economics. Available from: 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/news/year.asp?yyyy=2016#899. 
 
Schmieder, J. F., & Trenkle, S. (2016). Disincentive Effects of Unemployment Benefits and 
the Role of Caseworkers. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9868. Bonn: Institute for the Study of 





Table 1. Overview of quantitative studies on the effects of benefit sanctions: Regional variations and the role of caseworkers and monitoring mechanisms 
Study Country Data Outcome Method Main findings 
























- The study identifies ex-ante effects and ex-post effects of benefit sanctions. Ex-ante 
effects refer to claimants who received warnings of a sanction without its enforcement, 
whereas ex-post effects refers to claimants who received a warning followed by a 
sanction. 
- Both sanctioned and non-sanctioned claimants are more likely to leave unemployment, 
although at a cost of reduced post-unemployment earnings. However, only sanctioned 
claimants experienced lower employment duration or discontinuous employment 
compared to non-sanctioned claimants. 
- According to the authors, the negative effects of benefit sanctions can be improved by 
combining a reduction in the severity of benefit sanctions and an increase in monitoring 
intensity. 




























- Benefit claimants, who were allocated to less supportive caseworkers at registration, 
had faster transitions to employment in the short term, compared to benefit claimants 
assigned to more lenient caseworkers. 
- Moreover, claimants with less supportive caseworkers revealed a higher propensity to 
have more stable jobs. 
- No significant effect was reported in terms of reliance of longer sanctions or referral to 
active labour market programmes. 






























- The study allows for the decomposition of the caseworker’s effect into an indirect effect 
through the assignment to active labour market programmes and a residual direct effect , 
which may include the use of sanctions, pressure to accept jobs and other personal traits 
pertaining to the counselling style. 
- Results show that the indirect effect exerted by less supportive caseworkers – through 
referrals to training schemes/active labour market programmes – on claimants’ 
transitions to employment is not significant. 
- Conversely, the direct effect appears to be positive and levelling off over time. 
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Table 1. (cont.) Overview of quantitative studies on the effects of benefit sanctions: Regional variations and the role of caseworkers and monitoring 
mechanisms 
















- The analyses allow for ex-ante and ex-post effects of benefit sanctions to be
distinguished.
- The exit rate of non-sanctioned benefit recipients is strongly affected by the intensity of
the sanction policy.
- Results suggest that benefit sanctions lead to rapid exit rates from unemployment.
- Moreover, a stricter sanction regime is positively correlated with a reduction of
unemployment also for the non-sanction recipients (ex-ante effect).
- The combination of both more intensive monitoring of job-search activities and an









































- A widespread variation is detected in the sanction referral rates for Job Seeker’s
Allowance (JSA) across local authorities.
- The association between adverse sanctions and the rate of exit from JSA, although
existed before the introduction of Welfare Reforms which began in 2011, became three
times stronger in the following period.
- Nearly 20 percent of those exiting unemployment benefits, while having received an
adverse sanction, reported finding work whereas the remaining 80 percent left for
destinations unrelated to work.
- No association was detected between sanctioning rates and increasing employment or
decreasing unemployment across local authorities.
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Table 1. (cont.) Overview of quantitative studies on the effects of benefit sanctions: Regional variations and the role of caseworkers and monitoring 
mechanisms 
Study Country Data Outcome Method Main findings 






















- At the individual level, younger unemployment benefit recipients have faster transitions 
to a sanction episode, compared to older benefit recipients. Disabled recipients and 
those holding a university degree display a slower entry into benefit sanctions. Moreover, 
the benefit level is negatively correlated with the imposition of sanctions, whereas having 
experienced repeated episodes of sanctions is positively related to the current risk of 
sanctions across genders and benefit cohorts. 
- At the regional level, the average unemployment duration is negatively correlated with 
benefit sanctions risks, whereas both the vacancy rate and the size of the secondary 
labour market display a positive correlation with benefit sanction transitions. This means 
that the probability of receiving a benefit sanction is greater when labour market 
conditions are more favourable. Moreover, unobserved heterogeneity at the regional 
level is significant, suggesting that differences in the implementation of the activation 
policies across local employment agencies matter in benefit sanction outcomes. 






















- Caseworkers do not appear to respond differently to differences across unemployed 
workers based on unemployment insurance eligibility. In other words, caseworkers do 
not seem to focus resources on disadvantaged unemployed people who approach the 
exhaustion of their unemployment benefits. This holds across a number of caseworker’s 
activities, including the number of contacts with unemployment benefit claimants and 
the use of sanctions. 
- Only a small and positive effect was detected for caseworkers referring benefit 
recipients with shorter eligibility close to the exhaustion point to active labour market 
programmes, leading to the extension of their unemployment benefit. 









Table 2. List of JCP offices (and codes) by geographical area and JCP district 
 
JCP offices 





Notes on merged JCP offices (when code is 
provided, data on both DWP Stat-Xplore and 
NOMIS were merged) 
(a) EAST AND SOUTH EAST OF SCOTLAND  
   
1. Edinburgh   
Edinburgh City/High Riggs 10585 Period data mostly reflect High Riggs (10578 
Edinburgh A in NOMIS) which is currently 
dormient; Edinburgh City (South St Andrew 
St.) opened recently (January 2010); 
10572 Torpichen 
Edinburgh Commercial St./Leith 10573 10577 Portobello 
Wester Hailes 10887  
   
2. Lothian   
Musselburgh 10575 10671 Haddington 
Bathgate 10891 10890 Z Bathgate B (NOMIS) or Bathgate 
Whitburn Rd (DWP) 
Dalkeith 10570  
Livingston 10872  
Broxburn 10892  
   
3. Borders   
Galashiels 10780 Galashiels (Market Street and New River 
House – DWP); Peebles Northgate (DWP only) 
10772 Kelso 
Penicuik 10576 10574 Loanhead 
Hawick 10770  
Eyemouth 10652  
   
4. Fife   
Cupar 10684  
Dunfermline 10685 Dunfermline (High St and Merchiston House – 
DWP) 
Kirkcaldy 10688  
Glenrothes 10687  
Leven 10690  
Cowdenbeath 10683  
St Andrews 10692 Outlier: excluded. 
   
5. Forth Valley / Central   
Stirling 10795 Stirling (St Ninians Rd and Wallage House, 
DWP) 
Falkirk 10792 Falkirk (Grahame House, High St and Wellside 
Place – DWP) 
10591 Boness 
10790 Denny 
Grangemouth 10793  
Alloa 10604  
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Table 2. (cont.) List of JCP offices (and codes) by geographical area and JCP district 
JCP offices 





Notes on merged JCP offices (when code is 
provided, data on both DWP Stat-Xplore and 
NOMIS were merged) 
   
(b) NORTH OF SCOTLAND   
   
6a. Tayside 1   
Dundee Gellatly St. 10626  
Dundee Wellgate House 10624  
Perth 10755  
Montrose 10627  
   
6b. Tayside 2   
Arbroath 10620  
Blairgowrie 10751  
Forfar 10625  
   
7. Highlands   
Inverness 10702 Inverness (Metropolitan House and Young St, 
DWP; 10704 Inverness B merged with 10702 
Inverness A, NOMIS) 
10606 Nairn 
Wick 10661 10660 Thurso 
Dingwall 10764  
Invergordon 10761  
Fort William 10701 Recently dormient. 
   
8a. Grampian 1   
Aberdeen Chapel St. 10616 Aberdeen Greyfriars House (DWP, currently 
dormient): merged with Aberdeen Chapel St., 
currently dormient. 
Aberdeen C 10619 Named as Aberdeen Ebury House in DWP 
Forres 10731  
Elgin 10730  
   
8b. Grampian 2   
Petehead 10615  
Buckie 10641  
Banff 10640  
Fraserburgh 10612 Outlier: excluded. 
   
9. Islands   
Stornoway 10762  
Lerwick 10608  
Portree 10703  
Kirkwall 10607  




Table 2. (cont.) List of JCP offices (and codes) by geographical area and JCP district 
JCP offices 





Notes on merged JCP offices (when code is 
provided, data on both DWP Stat-Xplore and 
NOMIS were merged) 
  
(c) WEST OF SCOTLAND  
   
10. Argyll and Bute (Clyde Coast)  
Dunoon 10631  
Oban 10633  
Rothesay 10603  
Campbeltown 10630 Sparsed observations. 
Helensburgh 10824 Helensburgh (Charlotte St and West Clyde St, 
DWP, merged). 
   
11. West Dunbartonshire    
Clydebank 10822  
Alexandria 10820  
Dumbarton 10823 Dumbarton (Bridge St and Meadowbank St, 
DWP) 
   
12. Renfrewshire and Inverclyde   
Paisley 10883 Paisley (High St and Lonend, DWP). 
Renfrew 10885 10588 Renfrew and Inverclyde 
Johnstone 10882  
Barrhead 10880  
Greenock 10501  
Port Glasgow 10884  
   
13. Dumfries and Galloway   
Dumfries 10531 Castle Douglas Carlingwalk St. (DWP only) 
Sanquhar – Queensberry Sq. (DWP only) 
Annan 10530 Lockerbie High St. (DWP only) 
Stranraer 10601 Newton Stewart (DWP only) 
   
14a. Ayrshire 1   
Girvan 10507  
Saltcoats 10801 10811 Kilwinning 
10512 Largs 
Kilmarnock 10812 10810 Kilmarnock ESJ merged 
Ayr 10502 Ayr (Carrick St and Wallacetoun House, DWP) 
10518 Troon 
   
14b. Ayrshire 2   
Cumnock 10504  
Irvine 10808  
Kilbirnie 10809  




Table 2. (cont.) List of JCP offices (and codes) by geographical area and JCP district 
JCP offices 





Notes on merged JCP offices (when code is 
provided, data on both DWP Stat-Xplore and 
NOMIS were merged) 
(d) GLASGOW, LANARKSHIRE AND EAST DUNBARTONSHIRE 
   
15a. Glasgow 1   
Partick 10558  
Glasgow Shawlands 10545 Glasgow Newlands (DWP only) 
10548 Glasgow Auldhouse 
10587 Hillington 
Parkhead 10552  
Maryhill 10554  
Castlemilk 10859  
   
15b. Glasgow 2   
Langside 10584  
Anniesland 10560  
Bridgeton 10541 Named as Glasgow Muslin St. (DWP) 
Govan 10549  
Easterhouse 10556  
   
15c. Glasgow 3   
Laurieston 10553 Named as Glasgow Pollockshaws Rd (DWP) 
Springburn 10561 Named as Glasgow Atlas Rd (DWP) 
Glasgow Wellfield St (DWP only) 
Drumchapel 10550  
Shettleston 10544 Glasgow Main St. (DWP only) 
   
16. South Lanarkshire   
Lanark 10852 10842 Carluke 
East Kilbride 10845  
Hamilton 10850 10566 Blantyre 
10863 Uddingston 
10853 Larkhall 
Rutherglen 10858  
Cambuslang 10842  
   
17. North Lanarkshire and East Dunbartonshire  
Motherwell 10856 Motherwell (Flemington House and Mason 
St., DWP) 
10860 Shotts 
10864 Wishaw ESJ 
Bellshill 10565  
Airdrie 10840 10844 Coatbridge 
Cumbernauld 10821 10794 Kilysth 
Kirkintilloch 10825  
Note: Glasgow City (NOMIS) Glasgow – Argyle St. (DWP): deleted – no sanctions/claimants; 
           Glasgow Central House (DWP): deleted no sanctions/claimants; 
           Glasgow Provan (DWP) 10506 Provan JC+ (NOMIS): deleted – no sanctions/claimants; 
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Figure 1. Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for 
differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP 
districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015 
(a) East and South East of Scotland 
 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
 
 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
(b) North of Scotland
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
(c) West of Scotland 
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Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
 
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
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Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) 
for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, 
geographical  areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, 
June 2000 – September 2015 
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